Chapter 1

WHAT ARE ETHICS ?

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Who Is My Neighbor?

When you ask the question, "What is ethics?," at a minimum you have the question, "How should I treat my neighbor?" Or, if you ask it in a more communitarian vein, "How should we treat our neighbors?" That is, assuming that we know who is within the scope of our moral concern, the question is, "What are our obligations toward those beings?" There are various answers, such as: we should respect their rights; or, we should protect their interests; or, we should love them. But, even if you think that you know what "protection of interest" or "respect of rights" or "love" is and, even more difficult, what it implies for your neighbor, there still is another question, as Jesus discovered when the lawyer asked him, "But who is my neighbor?" In other words, "What is the scope of our moral concern?"

I should note that a number of philosophers and theologians believe that there is a third question, namely, "Who or what am I?" That is, "What kind of character should I have? What kind of person should I be? What sort of dispositions and virtues should I cultivate such that I am going to feel and act in certain ways (or, at least, have a tendency or disposition to feel and act in those ways)?" Some people believe—and I think they have a point—that the latter is not really a third type of question because if you can answer it the first two questions will take care of themselves. However, ever since the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, it has been questions one and two that have received the most attention. And the debate about our obligations to animals especially raises question number two. I think it raises questions one and three as well but, on the face of it, it certainly raises the question, "Who is my neighbor?"

I will talk about a few considerations that arise when we try to answer that question, referring to a diagram I have on the board (Diagram 1). It is an upside down pyramid, which a number of people think can be used to illustrate the expanding scope of our moral concern during human history.

This is an adaptation of a diagram that I found in an article by Roderick Nash with the intriguing title, "The Importance of Arranging the Deck Chairs on the Titanic."[1] (Nash himself allows that if we are taking an historical approach to human ethics, some people think it should be illustrated not with an upside down pyramid but more with the shape of an hour glass. That is, there was a time early in the development of the human race when the scope of our direct moral concern extended to the entire environment. Then it gradually narrowed until nineteenth century robber-baron capitalism taught a look-out-for-number-one egoism. And now we are painfully trying to recover the lost wisdom of our ancestors by expanding the scope of our moral concern, taking lessons from the keepers of that ancient wisdom, such as some Native American religions.)

When we are asking how we can expand the scope of our moral concern beyond ourselves, we are assuming that we have moral concern for ourselves, that we want to take care of ourselves, love ourselves, respect ourselves and protect ourselves. (This is not always true, of course, but let us just make that assumption.) Then the question is, "Why should we extend that kind of concern beyond ourselves?"

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[1] Reprinted as "Do Rocks Have Rights?", Small Comforts for Hard Times, eds. Michael Mooney and Florian Stuber (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 121-134.



Diagram 1

Feelings and Reasons

Notice that one could forget about *reasons* when answering this question and appeal to *feelings.* Perhaps as the human race grows up we can correlate its growth with an expansion of the kinds of beings with which we feel a kinship. Now, as a philosopher, I deal with reasons a lot, but I do think that hugs have done a lot more to change minds than arguments have. Therefore I appreciate appeal to feelings rather than reasons as the foundation for expanding the scope of our moral concern. I think it may well be that an important aspect of the human race's growing up—just as part of a child's growing up—involves the expansion of the feelings of kinship to more than just one's self, to more than just one's family, to more than just one's tribe, nation, gender, race, and maybe to more than just one's species.

For example, in the *Minneapolis Star-Tribune* this morning, you may have noticed a picture of a model wearing a fur coat. It happens to be the fur of a gorilla, which a person is trying to sell for around $8000. It has her telephone number in the paper and you can call her if you like. She has already received a number of calls, including several saying, in effect, "Yes I would very much like to wrap you up in that—real tight." Many people feel a kind of revulsion at the notion of wearing a gorilla skin. Why? It may simply be a feeling of kinship with that type of primate. For many of us it would be like wearing our cousin's skin. No wonder that many people believe that appeals to feelings is both the most effective and the most appropriate way of answering the question, "Who is my neighbor?" I think it is quite possible that serious reading of St. Francis of Assisi or even Robinson Jeffers or Edward Abby can cultivate a sense of kinship with not just other humans but with other kinds of creatures and, in fact, with the environment as a whole.

The reaction of some people to that possibility is, "Feelings—schmeelings, I want some *reasons.* I want to be able to tell people who don't have those feelings that they cannot act on their feelings and that they ought to act *as if* they have certain feelings." Such people—and I am among them—want to be able to give some reasons for claiming that people *should* include within the scope of their moral concerns—whether they want to or whether they feel like it or not—beings other than themselves. I will discuss four kinds of reasons for expanding the scope of our moral concern beyond ourselves.

Enlightened Egoism

The first is fairly simple; I call it enlightened egoism. It teaches that the reason you should be concerned about beings other than yourself is because it helps yourself. The way to look out for number one is to look out for those around you. The way to be happy is to make sure that those around you are happy. At a minimum, enlightened egoism can expand the scope of your moral concern to family, tribe, and nation. Sophisticated egoist arguments have been made that yield concern for all human beings and even for non-human creatures as well as for the environment itself. Seek ye first the welfare of everything around you and your own welfare will be added unto you.

Enlightened egoism is a fairly effective appeal. In last Sunday's *Star Tribune* you may have noticed an article about the concern of many educators that in the elementary and middle schools children are *rude* to one another. They cheat and they hurt one another—psychologically, and even physically—sometimes terribly. So some educators are calling for ethics in the curriculum and—wouldn't you guess—a consultant was hired. The article says that one main thing the consultant wants to show the children is that it pays to be good. If you are honest and if you respect others, you yourself will be happier and will get farther. A good reputation is a very useful thing to have; it is to your self-interest to have it. I think that this can be a very effective appeal. In fact, in the Hebrew scriptures, in the optimistic wisdom literature, this is often the appeal. In *Psalms* and *Proverbs* the lesson is that if you fear God and obey God's commandments, you will be happy.

One problem with this sort of appeal is that it really is not a way of increasing the scope of your *direct* (or intrinsic) moral concern, because your own self-interest is still what is motivating you. Enlightened egoism does not teach you to enlarge the scope of your direct moral concern; rather, it teaches you to be smart about how to maximize your own, long-term, self-interest by taking an indirect (or instrumental) concern for the interest of others as a way of pursuing your own. Notice that if this is your stance, you probably should not say so. It would probably not be in your interest to tell your family and friends that the reason you are nice to them is because it trickles down on you. Your relationships with them will change for the worse if they really believe you have only an instrumental rather than intrinsic concern for their welfare. Therefore, even though egoism may be the *unstated stance* of a lot of people, it is not the *reason* that a lot of people give for their actions. Occasionally you will find authors making money with books like *Look Out For Number One*, but generally it is not to the interest of an egoist to teach egoism.

A more difficult problem for enlightened egoism is that, as a generalization, it seems false. It is not always the case that the way to make yourself happy is to make others happy. Sometimes moral decisions to pursue the interests of others can be very very costly to the self. The pessimistic wisdom literature in Hebrew Scriptures, such as *Job* and especially *Ecclesiastes,* is filled with puzzlements over the fact that sometimes the righteous really do suffer. Sometimes, when we confront decisions about whether to treat another as a neighbor, we will need reasons that appeal to something other than our own self-interest, because sometimes neighborliness conflicts with our self-interest, even our long-term self-interest. This conflict will sometimes arise when we ask ourselves how to treat strangers of our own species, and it will

often arise when we ask how to treat members of other species or the environment as a whole. Farmers often point out that it is in their own interest to treat their animals well, because unstressed animals produce more. I think this is largely true, but such examples as egg factories and veal production lead me to think that it is far from always true. Although we do well to remember how much our own interests are connected with the interests of those around us, it is not likely that even a very sophisticated type of enlightened egoism will, by itself, get us very far up the pyramid in diagram 1.

Moral Extensionism

So the question is whether you can give some reasons for extending the scope of your *direct* moral concern, that is, for taking an intrinsic moral concern for beings other than yourself. Perhaps the strongest reason—and the one we find in various versions throughout history and around the world—asks you to consider why you think you are so special, why you care so much for yourself, why you think that your rights should be respected (or at least why you think you should respect yourself and care for yourself). How do you answer? Perhaps you say things like, "Well, I have desires, including the desire to stay alive and to prosper," or, "I have free will and think my right to make choices should be respected,' or, "I can suffer and when I get pricked I bleed, and that's not good." If these are the sorts of reasons you care for yourself, notice that those reasons also apply to other beings. Thus the claim of many thinkers is that it is rationally arbitrary to stop with just yourself, because the very considerations you grant yourself also apply to others.

Which others do your considerations apply to? How high up the pyramid in diagram 1 do they take you? The answer, of course, depends on which of your features cause you to think of yourself as deserving your (and perhaps others') intrinsic concern. Suppose you answer, as many philosophers have answered, that what is special about myself is that I have autonomy, I use reason, I make free choices, I have a self-concept, I am conscious of myself as a being having desires including the desire to continue living, and so on. Or suppose you answer, as many theologians have answered, that I am a child of God, I am created in God's image, the object of God's love, and so on. Then you should look around and you will see that there are other beings that also have those features. In fact, to avoid arbitrariness you will have to go beyond family, nation, tribe, and gender and probably include all human beings within the scope of your direct moral concern. It is the case that tribalism, nationalism, racism, sexism and so on are unfortunately very much alive and well in today's world. But when people give reasons for how people *ought* to treat one another, generally the arguments appeal to some features that belong to all normal human beings, features such as freedom, having desires and feelings, being an imager of God, and so on. Hence, there is a persuasive case for extending the scope of our moral concern to all humans, for what is often called moral *humanism.*

But is this where we should stop? A number of philosophical and theological thinkers are calling for a rejection of what they see as humanistic or anthropocentric speciesism. They call it this because they believe to stop with members of your own species, when at least some of the important features that give moral rights to humans also apply to non-human beings, is no less arbitrary than is racism or sexism. This view is sometimes called moral *extensionism,* because it extends at least some of the moral rights of humans to other types of beings.

One fairly common argument for extensionism appeals to the social fact that within the scope of our direct moral concern are human beings with the sort of mental disabilities that cause their actual (and even potential) functioning to rise no higher than that of other vertebrates. In terms of having desires, having beliefs, having sophisticated forms of behavior, decision-making capacities and so on, many animals compare very favorably to humans with disabilities. Thus, the argument goes, only arbitrary speciesism prevents us from seeing that whatever makes the latter morally important, also protects the former.

Another, perhaps stronger, argument for moral extensionism appeals to the biological fact that many animals are *sentient,* that is, they can feel pain and pleasure. And, since one of our strongest moral obligations is to avoid causing unjustified suffering, we should not arbitrarily restrict the scope of this obligation to only some of the beings that can suffer. Consistency requires that we extend it to all beings that can suffer. Now, some critics of the animal rights movement complain that its proponents inflate their emotional ammunition by focusing on primates and big mammals – the charismatic megavertebrates or on the cute and fuzzy animals. But it is important to notice that the logic of the above argument applies to all animals that have the morally relevant feature to which the argument appeals. If the appeal is to the capacity to feel pain, then the scope of the extension of direct moral concern should include many types of animals, including non-cuddly ones. This is the point of the most famous book on the issue—*Animal Liberation* by Peter Singer which was first published in 1975[2] and has recently come out in a second edition.

Animal Liberation is the only philosophy text I know that has recipes in it. In fact, the recipes are an important part of the argument because Singer is what we call a utilitarian. This simply means that he makes moral decisions by determining, among all the options available to him, which option has the best consequences for all those affected by the decision. "All those" includes everyone and everything that can feel pleasure or pain (or, in some versions, everyone or everything that can satisfy preferences). Singer realizes that his argument for vegetarianism cannot simply point out, for example, that it is painful for a lobster to be boiled alive or for a steer to be raised in the stress of a feedlot. To gain entrance into the scope of our direct moral concern simply means that one's interest will now be weighed. But the mere fact that we are weighing the pleasures and pains of the animal in our decision does not mean that the animal will win. For we may gain a greater amount of pleasure out of eating the animal than the amount of pain the animal suffers. Especially if animals are treated with some degree of respect, it may be that human beings derive more pleasure from eating them than they suffer by being raised and killed in order to feed humans.

But Singer's reply is that the utilitarian thing to do is not simply to improve the balance of pleasure over pain in the universe. Utilitarianism is a maximization theory. We must choose that action or develop that practice which will result in the *greatest* amount of pleasure over pain in the universe. And that is why the recipes are an important part of Singer's argument. Recipes for tofu and other delicious vegetarian dishes are meant to show that, in the long run, humans can get as much or even more pleasure out of a vegetarian diet than out of one that includes meat. And since this pleasure is not offset by any intentional animal suffering, a vegetarian diet is the way to provide the best balance of pleasure and pain in the world. Now, I have tried some of Singer's recipes and I think that they are healthful, economical, ecologically responsible, and delicious. But, apart from the fact that my children do not entirely agree, I am not convinced that his recipes and his calculations demonstrate that a vegetarian diet (as opposed to one that uses a modest amount of meat) is the way to maximize overall happiness or preference satisfaction.

Moreover, I agree with those philosophers and theologians who do not think that calculating consequences is the best way to decide questions about moral rights and obligations. I must here emphasize that many animal rights proponents give non-utilitarian arguments. They point out that we are not allowed to harm other members of the moral community even if doing so is the way to maximize good results. So, if we have an obligation not to inflict suffering, that obligation is not overridden just because inflicting suffering on some beings results in the greatest general good. Rather, we must weigh relative rights. And when we do so in a fair-minded way, the argument goes, we will see that our obligation to avoid harming animals is not as easily overridden as our lifestyle assumes. This, then, is a non-utilitarian argument for taking animal rights seriously.

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[2] New York: A New York Review Book, 1975.

I should note that some activists extend the scope of direct moral concern well beyond those beings that can feel pleasure or pain. They believe that something is harmed whenever its interests are violated, and that its *interests* extend well beyond feeling pleasure or pain. It is quite plausible to think that an animal has an interest in *staying alive,* for example. Perhaps even a rhododendron does. The mere fact that they cannot *assert* their interests does not mean they do not have them, because everyone knows that there are humans who are incapable of asserting their interests (sometimes throughout their entire lives, such as humans with severe mental disabilities), but they still have interests, as well as the right not to have those interests wantonly ignored. Thus, perhaps even Mt. Rushmore has an interest in not being defaced (or faced), as a few extremists have suggested.

At this point many people are inclined to say, "See I told you this whole debate about extending our moral concern is ridiculous. If plants and even rocks have rights, what are we going to eat? Or build with? Or wear? Or plow? Or even walk on?"

In reply, two things should be noted. First, some arguments for extending our moral concern may be much stronger than others. If the strongest arguments have to do with not inflicting unnecessary pain, one can extend rights to sentient animals without going all the way up the pyramid in diagram 1. Second, even when we settle the issue of the scope of our direct moral concern and thereby answer the question of who is our neighbor, we must be very careful about deciding what that implies for the question of how should we treat our neighbors. Fair (or even equal) treatment does not mean identical treatment. Depending on the kinds and degrees of interest that other beings have, it might be quite responsible to override some of the interests of some of them for the sake of others of them. Even if asparagus and mosquitos and cows have interests, they might quickly and responsibly be overridden by the much greater interests of humans. The real issue, say animal rights proponents, is whether the interests of members of other species are going to be weighed at all. If they are, some changes in our lifestyles and our treatment of animals seem to be morally required.

Ecocentric Environmentalism

So far I have discussed extending the scope of our moral concern to other individuals and other types of individuals. But many ecologists think this type of extensionism is very strange. For example, the "land ethic," as taught by Aldo Leopold in his famous *Sand Country Almanac*[3], claims that it is not so much *individual* animals toward which we have to extend our moral concern; rather, it is the ecosystem or the land as a whole. He talks about the beauty, stability, integrity, and diversity of the environment as a whole. He says that it is wrong to impinge on beauty, integrity and stability, and that it is right to protect them. This is the essence to what he called the land ethic. It has been developed by other people since Leopold, who sometimes call it ecocentrism, or biocentrism, or, simply, environmentalism.

The main idea of environmentalism is that the scope of our moral concern has to include the ecosystem as a whole and not (just) individuals. It is the *neighborhood* that matters, and not (just) the *neighbors.* Some environmentalists believe that the individualistic extensionism I outlined above is actually kind of silly. Here is a quotation from an article by Mark Sagoff entitled "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce":

> *The way creatures in nature die is typically violent: predation, starvation, disease, parasitism, cold. If the dying animal in the wild understood his condition, what would he think? Surely he would prefer to be raised on a farm where his chances of survival would be good and to escape from the wild where they are negligible. Either way, the animal will*

[3] New York: Balantine Books, 1970. First published in 1949.

> *be killed; few die of old age. The path from birth to slaughter however, is nearly always longer and less painful in the barnyards than in the woods. The misery of animals in nature beggars by comparison every other form of suffering in the world. Mother nature is so cruel to her children that she makes Frank Purdue [the chicken magnate] look like a saint.*[4]

Sagoff suggests that the logic of animal liberation leads to the following: "Starving deer in the woods might be adopted as pets, they might be fed in kennels. Birds that now kill earthworms may repair instead to bird houses stocked with food—including textured soybean that looks and smells like worms. And to protect the brutes from cold we might heat their dens or provide shelter for the all too many who freeze." In other words, those who extend moral concern to other (types of) individuals, seem committed "to sacrifice the authenticity, integrity, and complexity of ecosystems for the welfare of animals." In contrast, the "environmentalist would sacrifice the welfare of individual creatures to preserve the authenticity, integrity and complexity of ecological systems." Perhaps as a result of sentimentalized Walt Disney films, or maybe *The Far Side* cartoons, we can cultivate an interest in individual members of other species. But a true environmentalist is concerned about the integrity of ecosystems, and the integrity of an ecosystem is going to include a lot of misery for the individual animals within it. If the diversity and integrity of the neighborhood includes predators, it is wrong to be sentimental about the feelings of all the neighbors.

So here we have two very different perspectives on extending the scope of our direct moral concern beyond traditional humanism (or what is sometimes labeled "anthropocentricism"). One is focused on the interests of individuals and the other on the environment as a whole. Much ink is being spilled these days over whether these perspectives can be harmonized or, at least, balanced, but I cannot discuss that here except to say that the religious stewardship model I will raise in a moment tries to do that. What I should mention briefly at this point are three objections that have been leveled against ecocentric ethics. First, some critics object that appeals to the beauty, integrity, stability, and diversity of the ecosystem are so vague and subjective that they are useless for moral guidance in a pluralistic society. Second, even if we could reach some agreement on the above criteria, the implications for human obligations would still be far from clear. On the one hand, if we see ourselves as simply one aspect of the environment (which environmentalists often invite us to do), our impact on it should perhaps be regarded as simply nature's way of evolving. On the other hand, if we take on special duties to preserve nature as it is apart from human impact, we categorize ourselves as having a special status. The latter seems to be a reintroduction of anthropocentrism; it's just that this is an anthropocentrism of obligation rather than privilege, suggesting that humans alone among the species must sacrifice their own welfare for the greater environmental good.

I think that environmentalists can give intelligent replies to these criticisms, but I hope you can see that they are serious enough to underscore the third objection, which is that most people see no justification for extending *direct* moral concern to the ecosystem as a whole. Of course, both humanists and animal rightists can grant that protecting the environment is necessary for protecting current and future humans and animals, but that sort of "individualistic" thinking is what "holistic" ecocentrism rejects. Without exploring all possible justifications for ecocentrism, let me say that the ones I find most persuasive are those that seek to evoke a sense of reverence and awe toward this marvelous earth and the beautifully delicate balances we find in the environment. In fact, the inspirational writings of many environmentalists (including, but not only, those that celebrate the Earth as "Gaia") have affinities with religious outlooks that assert either the sacredness of nature (such as animism and pantheism), or the monistic view that, at bottom, everything is one (such as some forms of Hinduism and Buddhism), or in some way spiritualize the interconnectedness of things. A profound sense of respect for natural objects and their complex interrelationships seems often to be basically a religious feeling. It is interesting that some of the latest

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[4] Report from the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, Vol. 4, no. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 6-8.

contemporary efforts to extend our moral concern appeal to some of our earliest religious wisdom. Hence I conclude this section by noting that these ancient religious perspectives may provide a deep justification for an increasingly popular moral view about our obligations to the environment as a whole.

The Theistic Stewardship Model

However, most Americans—including me—do not share religious beliefs about everything being one or everything being sacred. So my final section raises the religious perspective that is more familiar to most of us and one that, at its best, tries to incorporate the legitimate concerns of both extensionism and environmentalism. This is the theistic stewardship perspective, which teaches that humans are imagers of a God who created and loves everything—us, other individual animals, the species, the ecosystems, everything. God loves the sparrows, every individual, and also the species, and also the habitat on which they depend. Of course God allows them to die; all individuals die (with a few possible exceptions such as Elijah and Jesus) and my biologist friends tell me that upwards of 99% of the species have died. So God's love is quite compatible with death, although the fact that God allows species to die no more permits our unjustly killing them than does the fact that God allows persons to die permit our unjustly killing them. Whatever killing is permitted or required must be done out of covenantal responsibility. The idea is that everything is a gift from God and that, out of gratitude for the gift, we must conscientiously exercise our God-given responsibility to be the stewards of creation, to appreciate it and to use it in a way that sustains it for future generations. In doing so we image God by making life-and-death decisions. This role of imaging God (even playing God) must be fulfilled without usurping God's role by ignoring covenantal responsibilities, by treating nature and other beings as our own property to be exploited as we see fit rather than as gifts on loan to be nurtured and used as God sees fit. Notice that with this stewardship model it is difficult to say whether the steward's concern for the rest of creation is direct (intrinsic) or instrumental. Out of such attitudes as gratitude, humility, and obedience, stewards accept the privilege and responsibility to care for the neighborhood, including the beings and species within it. Although the primary sense of obligation is to the Creator and thereby "only" secondarily and indirectly to the creation, the "only" should be given scare quotes. This is because, at the same time, the stewards feel a direct kinship with the creation, a feeling of "brother and sister" with some of it and of "fellow creature" with all of it. This feeling naturally elicits direct concern and even empathy for all of creation. Moreover, the belief that the Creator's "eye is on the sparrow" simultaneously provides self-interested reasons for careful attention even when empathy fails.

I recently read a survey showing that 82% of farmers in Canada accept something like the above model for their ethics. It would not surprise me if a similarly high percentage of farmers in the United States also accept it. If so, it provides a language that can be used when talking with farmers about obligations toward the animals that they raise. Of course, Professor Lynn White and others have argued that it is precisely this model that has caused most of the problems. In his article *The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis*[5] White points out that Genesis has been interpreted as a license to conquer and exploit the Creation. We have taken on ourselves what I sometimes label "a most favoured species" status and, instead of emphasizing our responsibility to sustain the earth, we emphasize our privilege to abuse it.

There is no doubt that some strands of the Judeo-Christian traditions have used the Bible to justify exploiting nature and abusing other species, just as some have used the Bible to justify slavery, racism, and genocide. As a result, some people who are sympathetic to a stewardship model, substitute *future generations* rather than the Biblical God as the locus of our stewardly responsibilities. I find deep theoretical and practical problems with such a move, but I cannot discuss them here. Rather, I simply endorse the strand of the Judeo-Christian tradition that interprets theistic stewardship as the grateful taking on of the responsibility to nurture and sustain rather than the gleeful exploiting of the license to conquer and destroy.

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[5] Science, 155 (1967), pp. 1203-07.

One of the most thoughtful contemporary writers who consciously employs the theistic stewardship model is Wendell Berry. In *The Unsettling of America*[6] he distinguishes between the mentality of the exploiter and that of the steward. The aim of the conquering exploiter is profits, whereas the aim of the nurturing steward is health—the health of people, of animals, and of the environment as a whole. Berry's model for exploitation is strip mining, an activity he thinks industrial farming parallels when it causes the erosion of two bushels of top soil for every bushel of corn it produces. His model for nurturing is the sort of sustainable agriculture practiced by Amish farmers, among others. Crucial to stewardship is the sense of gratitude for a gift given, an attitude that elicits the desire to pass it on to others. Hence the title of another of Berry's books is *The Gift of Good Land.*[7] The last paragraph of this book gives his own stewardship view about our obligations to animals:

> *That is not to suggest that we can live harmlessly, or strictly at our own expense; we depend upon other creatures and survive by their deaths. To live, we must daily break the body and shed the blood of Creation. When we do this knowingly, lovingly, skillfully, reverently, it is a sacrament. When we do it ignorantly, greedily, clumsily, destructively, it is a desecration. In such desecration we condemn ourselves to spiritual and moral loneliness, and others to want.*

Since I am out of time I cannot say much about what this religious perspective suggests regarding the respectful treatment of animals and land. However, I have read that perhaps 20 million vertebrates are killed each year for research and that five billion are killed for food.[8] Before they are killed, they are fed 70% of our grain production.[9] This practice, of course, is in turn responsible for heavy use of land, water, and chemicals. It takes 15 times as much energy to produce a pound of pork as a pound of fruit, vegetables, or milk.[10] Now, I am not at all sure Berry would think that these numbers are compatible with a sacramental attitude. But I do think he draws attention to the right issue, which is not so much *whether* you raise animals and kill animals for food, but *how* you do it. That is the stewardship ethic which I commend. Thank you for your attention.

Notes

1. Reprinted as "Do Rocks Have Rights?", Small Comforts for Hard Times, eds. Michael Mooney and Florian Stubber (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 121-134.
2. New York: A New York Review Book, 1975.
3. New York: Ballantine Books, 1970. First published in 1949.
4. Report from the Center for Philosphy and Public Policy, 4 (2) (Spring 1989), pp. 6-8.
5. *Science,* 155 (1967), pp. 1203-07
6. New York: Avon, 1977.
7. San Francisco: North Point Press, 1981.
8. Strachan Donnelley and Kathleen Nolan, "Animals, Science and Ethics," *Hastings Center Report Supplement,* May/June, 1990, p.2.
9. Alan Durning, "Fat of the Land," *World Watch,* May/June, 1991, p.12.
10. Durning, p.13.

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6 New York: Avon, 1977.

7 San Francisco: North Point Press, 1981.

8 Strachan Donnelley and Kathleen Nolan, "Animals, Science, and Ethics," Hastings Center Report Supplement, May/June, 1990, p. 2.

9 Alan Durning, "Fat of the Land," World Watch, May/June, 1991, p. 12.

10 Durning, p. 13.